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314 UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
the responsibility of the war against inflation.11 Under existing circum-
stances the decision of the circuit court of appeals was clearly correct. 12
SAUL W. GOLDSTEIN
SOLDIERS' AND SAILORS' CIVIL RELIEF ACT:
REDEMPTION OF PROPERTY SOLD DURING
TERM OF MILITARY SERVICE
Le Maistre v. Lefjers, 68 Sup. Ct. 371 (1948)
Le Maistre owned real estate in Florida on which taxes became
delinquent April, 1940, and on which a tax certificate was issued August,
1940. In accordance with Florida statutory procedure' a tax deed was
issued March, 1943. Le Maistre went on active duty in the Navy August,
1942, and served until December, 1945. In March, 1946, relying on
Section 205 of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940,2 he
instituted this suit in equity to set aside the tax deed and redeem the
land by payment of the taxes. Section 205 provides, in part, that military
service shall toll the running of any period provided for redemption of
real property. The circuit court denied relief, and the Florida Supreme
Court affirmed 3 on authority of De Loach v. Calihan,4 which held that
Section 205 indicates the period of indulgence while Section 5005 indi-
cates the class of real property on which a soldier or sailor is granted
"1 Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321 (1944).
'Fleming y. Rhodes, 67 Sup. Ct. 1140 (1947); Porter v. Harrison, 68 F. Supp.
274 (E. D. Mo. 1946); cf. Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 68 Sup. Ct. 421 (1948);
Bowles v. Ell-Carr Co., 71 F. Supp. 482 (S. D. N. Y. 1947); Bowles -v. Ormesher, 65
F. Supp. 791 (D. Neb. 1946). But cf. Porter v. Wilson, 69 F. Supp. 447 (D. Ore.
1947).
1FIA. STAT. 194 , cc. 193, 194.
254 STAT. 1178, So U. S. C. App. § 525 (1940), as amended, 56 STAT. 769, S0
U. S. C. App. §525 (Supp. 1942).
'Le Maistre v. Leffers, 31 So.2d 155 (Fla. 1947).
'30 So.2d 910 (Fla. 1947).
854 STAT. 1178, 50 U. S. C. App. §560 (1940), as amended, 56 STAT. 769, 50
U. S. C. App. §560 (Supp. 1942), "The provisions of this section shall apply when
on taxes or assessments... in respect of . .. real property owned and occupied for
dwelling, professional, business; or agricultural purposes .... t
1
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indulgence. On certiorari, HELD, the Florida court read the act too re-
strictively. Le Maistre's failure to show that his property came within
the provisions of Section 500 did not bar recovery. Reversed.
The legislature expresses its intention by written enactments, and
that intention must primarily be ascertained from the language used in the
statute itself.8 It is a settled principle of law that in the construction
of any statute the court should attempt to follow the words of the statute
in an effort to reach its intended effect.7 In the absence of precedent the
court must rely wholly on its own construction and interpretation of the
statute as written, giving paramount consideration to the intent of the
legislature.8 When the language is not explicit, the legislative intent is
to be gathered from the causes which moved the legislature to enact the
law.9  The Florida court considered the language dear. The United
States Supreme Court decided that, though the statute specifically limited
the complainant to the type of property named, 'the beneficient purpose
of the act would be destroyed if such a technical construction were allowed.
In strict construction of a statute, courts refuse to extend the import
of words used so as to embrace causes or acts which the words do not
clearly describe; in liberal construction, courts enlarge or restrict the
words of the statute so as to accomplish more effectively the purpose
intended.10 When the court adheres to the mere letter of the statute,
there is always the possibility that it will fail to penetrate deeply into
the general purpose."
The United States Supreme Court and the courts of several states
have previously given liberal construction to other sectionsl2 of the
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, but this is the first interpretation
'United States v. Goldenberg, 168 U. S. 95 (1897).
7United States v. Standard Brewery, Inc., 251 U. S. 210 (1920); State v. Leuch,
156 Wis. 121, 144 N. W. 290 (1913); 3 SUTERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTON
§5504 (3d ed. 1943).
'United States v. Rosenblum Truck Lines, 315 U. S. 50 (1942); United States v.
Cooper Corp., 312 U. S. 600 (1941); Steele v. Gann, 197 Ark. 480, 123 S. W.2d 520
(1939); People v. Rapini, 107 Colo. 363, 112 P.2d 551 (1941); Bradley v. State, 79 Fla.
651, 84 So. 677 (1920).
'United States v. Missouri Pac. R. R., 278 U. S. 269 (1929); Wilson v. Rousseau,
4 How. 646 (U. S. 1845); Levy Court of Washington County v. Ringgold, 5 Pet. 451
(U. S. 1831); Postmaster-General of United States v. Early, 12 Wheat. 136 (U. S.
1827).
10Causey v. Guilford County, 192 N. C. 298, 135 S. E. 40 (1926).
"'Lawton v. Sweitzer, 354 IIl. 620, 188 N. E. 811 (1934).
"tBoone v. Lightner, 319 U. S. 561 (1943); Royster v. Lerderle, 128 F.2d 197
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